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Parking Regulations
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Association
of
London
Government
Evidence
to
London
Assembly
Parking
Enforcement
Scrutiny
Introduction
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1. At one time, anyone who drove a car could park where
they wanted, without
time limit, free of charge. As car numbers have soared those
days have gone,
but the dream still remains for many. And where yellow lines
or parking
restrictions prevent drivers from parking where they want,
many will take a risk,
parking illegally and putting their own needs above other
road users’.
2. It is estimated by the ALG1that about 50m illegal parking
acts take place each
year in London. Many may seem small to the perpetrators,
yet they cause
congestion, delaying buses in particular and can cause additional
casualties.
For example, a driver parking illegally outside a bank to
use the cash machine
may stop for only two minutes, yet may delay many other
people, in cars and
buses, trying to get past. Good parking regulations are
needed to prevent this
and these are valueless if not enforced.
3. In the late 1980s, London’s boroughs waged a campaign
to take over
responsibility for parking enforcement from the police,
who could not give it
any priority. In many parts of London there was parking
anarchy and London’s
boroughs wished to end that.
4. London’s parking enforcement regime is directed to tackling
that level of illegal
parking which causes accidents, causes congestion and prevents
those
permitted, where regulations restrict parking (such as residents
or people with
disabilities) from getting a parking space. In permitted
parking areas it is
designed to ensure that drivers may find a parking space
easily. However, to
achieve that enforcement is needed. And any enforcement
activity generates
complaints from those who are subject to it, while those
who benefit, for
example, by finding a parking space easily, rarely acknowledge
that good
enforcement makes this possible.
5. London’s boroughs look to ensuring that parking enforcement
is effective and
fair. With the volume of enforcement activity as high as
it is it is inevitable that
some errors will occur. Consistent results from the parking
adjudicators
suggest that the London boroughs take the right action in
99.5% of cases2.
Yet, even that 0.5% which remain represents 30,000 cases
where motorists have
not been treated properly from the outset. The London boroughs
recognise
that more efforts must be made, especially in these areas.
Why have parking regulations
6. The issue of parking enforcement cannot be considered
without an
understanding of the basis for parking regulations. The
first parking restrictions were introduced in the 1920s,
with the first meters (in Manchester
Square) in 1958. In Britain, and in central London in particular,
it was not
uncommon to find cars double or even triple parked in various
locations. A
study of road accidents in London in 1947/48 showed an overall
increase in
accidents of 8% whereas in another part where several miles
of road had had
parking controls introduced, accidents fell by 31.5%, giving
a difference of 40%
overall. Studies following the introduction of the new metered
controlled zones
showed that the number of parking vehicles was halved, and
traffic speeds
increased by 16% from 8.2mph to 9.6mph. Traffic accidents
decreased by 21%
in the zone but in similar uncontrolled areas the number
of accidents rose by
22%3.
7. The Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 defines the objectives
for which parking
regulations can be introduced. These can be summarised as:
• Safety
• Maintenance of access to premises
• Congestion reduction
• Management of the kerb space where demand for parking
exceeds supply
Revenue raising is not a lawful objective for introducing
parking controls.
8. The precise regulations made will depend on the circumstances
at the location.
Regulations introduced for safety reasons are more likely
to be in the form of
double yellow lines or ‘school entrance – keep clear’ markings.
Where
congestion reduction is the issue, single yellow lines might
suffice. Meters, pay
and display bays and residents’ zones are all symptomatic
of areas where
demand exceeds supply and the local authority must give
priority to particular
groups of motorists or forms of parking (such as short stay).
9. Typically, residents’ permit holders will be given priority
in residential areas,
while short stay parking and deliveries will be given priority
in town centres and
shopping areas.
10. In many locations where such measures are introduced
it is not possible to meet
all the demand for parking spaces, even for priority users.
In many residential
areas the demand for residents’ parking now outpaces the
supply of spaces. In
mixed use areas, particularly in areas such as Soho, there
are competing
demands from shoppers, residents and deliveries. Councils
frequently must
make difficult decisions over allocation of kerb space between
these demands.
11. Short stay parking is regulated either by having limited
stay free parking bays or
by charges. Short stay free parking is difficult to enforce
and paid for parking
provides a more effective rationing mechanism while also
making enforcement
simpler. For further simplification and to improve customer
service, meters are
giving way to pay and display machines and electronic forms
of payment such as
mobile phone payments. The Government’s and the ALG’s advice
is that parking
charges should be set so as to achieve about 85% occupancy.
This ensures that
there are always a few spaces available and minimises traffic
searching for a parking space and causing congestion. This
rationale leads to parking charges
of up to £4 an hour in central London.
12. Many traders would like to see lower parking charges,
yet research by LPAC4 and
in Europe (through the COST 342 project)5 shows that there
is no correlation
between parking charges and economic vitality of a centre.
Several cities in
Europe have tried to introduce an initial free period of
parking (such as 30
minutes) to encourage retailing. Evidence, here6, shows
that this has no
impact on economic activity but adds to congestion while
cars hunt for a free
parking space.
Controlled Parking Zones
13. Controlled Parking Zones (CPZs) are areas where parking
on every part of every
street is controlled. They are typically introduced in town
centres and
residents’ parking areas. They are different from introducing
individual
elements of parking control (such as a length of yellow
line) in that the
standard hours of operation are displayed on entry signs
to the area, dispensing
with the need for individual signs on posts for each stretch
of regulation unless
hours of operation are different. This approach has the
advantage of a
significant reduction in sign clutter on streets. However,
at the same time,
CPZs that are too big can mean that motorists miss the entry
signs and therefore
the hours of operation and confusion may then result.
14. Any type of controlled parking zone is difficult and
expensive to introduce, both
in terms of the equipment and signs on the street and in
terms of the
procedures and consultations that must be gone through.
Councils do not,
therefore, introduce such zones except, in general, where
there is public
support for them. This may result, in the short term, in
parking being displaced
from one street to another, but this is a more satisfactory
approach to the public
as a whole than attempting to introduce a zone into any
area where a majority
oppose it.
15. Currently, all or most of the following boroughs are
covered by CPZs
• Camden
• City of London
• Kensington & Chelsea
• Hammersmith & Fulham
• Westminster
16. Much of the remaining area of inner London is covered
by CPZs while, in outer
London, CPZs cover town centres and residential areas around
railheads.
17. The argument is frequently made that hours of operation
of zones should be
common throughout London. Yet activities vary in different
parts of London.The City of London, for example, is busy
during the week but quiet at weekends,
while the West End is busy on a Saturday and many town centres
now find that
Sunday is their second busiest shopping day of the week.
Many areas which are
busy during the day become quiet in the evenings, yet places
such as Soho and
Bayswater experience serious parking congestion until late
in the evening.
18. Any attempt to impose constant hours of operation would
leave some areas
controlled at times where there was no need for the control
while other areas
would be uncontrolled while still busy. This would not be
in anyone’s interest.
19. The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions7
specify in precise detail
the signs that must be used to indicate parking restrictions.
Where there is an
unusual or non-standard type of restriction the Department
for Transport must
specifically authorise each sign (and, often, its location).
20. It is axiomatic that there is no point in having parking
(or traffic) regulations if
these are not enforced.
Reviewing regulations
21. Traditionally, parking regulations were reviewed rarely,
if at all. Where
enforcement was limited or non-existent, an out of date
regulation made little
difference. The onset of tougher enforcement through the
decriminalised
regime changed that. Government advice urged councils to
review regulations
and, in practice, the political accountability for enforcement
meant that
councils found it hard to continue enforcing regulations
that could not be
justified. Nowadays, parking regulations are, in practice,
under continual
review.
History of legislation
22. Parking enforcement was traditionally the responsibility
of the Metropolitan
and City police forces. Traffic wardens were introduced
in 1969 to supplement
the work of police officers in this area as police officers
were unable to enforce
the regulations effectively and lack of enforcement was
an issue even then.
23. However, even with traffic wardens, enforcement was
still not being carried out
effectively and several reports in the 1980s, notably the
National Audit Office’s
‘Fine Lines’ (1989), drew attention to then problems this
caused.
24. Following lobbying by the London boroughs, the Road
Traffic Act 1991 provided
for the decriminalisation of parking enforcement and its
transfer to local
authorities in special parking areas (SPAs). In London,
SPAs were created to
cover the whole of London, except for the red route network,
the Whitehall
security zone and the Royal Parks. These became operational
during 1993/94
with a pilot scheme starting in part of Wandsworth in July
1993
25. Subsequent legislation in London Local Authorities Acts
in 1995, 2000 and
London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003
modified the 1991
Act, while the London Local Authorities Act 1996 provided
for local authority
enforcement of bus lanes and the joint 2003 Act provides
for decriminalised
enforcement of other moving traffic offences, such as box
junctions.
26. The Traffic Management Act 2004 consolidates this legislation
and extends the
provisions contained in the London Acts to the rest of the
country.
Reasons for decriminalisation
27. The reasons for decriminalisation are found in the inability
of the police to
enforce parking regulations effectively. Studies in the
1980s indicate that only
1 illegal parking act in 100 was penalised and more than
50% of those fixed
penalty notices (FPNs) issued did not result in the penalty
being paid. The
Metropolitan Police, quite understandably, did not consider
parking
enforcement at all a priority and resources were limited.
For example, a traffic
warden force of 2,200 in the MPS in the early 1970s had
diminished to 1,100 by
the end of the 1980s. Patrols by Traffic Wardens became
more and more
sporadic to the point where some areas of RB Kensington
& Chelsea would only
be “enforced” by a mobile squad of 5 or 6 wardens for a
couple of hours per
week. Resource shortages in processing areas meant that
large numbers of
FPNs were written off systematically in order to clear backlogs8.
Notwithstanding that, the MPS parking enforcement service
cost the public
purse nearly £40m in 19889.
28. Police culture also worked against effective enforcement
of parking regulations
as senior police officers saw ‘law abiding’ drivers as part
of their ‘natural
constituency of support’ and were reluctant to antagonise
them with any form
of rigorous enforcement.
29. Lack of police enforcement resources also prevented
the introduction of new
controlled parking zones, even where these were strongly
demanded by the
public, as the police were not able to provide resources
for any enforcement of
new CPZs.
30. The result of this was excessive congestion caused by
illegal parking – and the
debates about the Road Traffic Act 1991 were dominated with
this issue both in
connection with decriminalisation of parking enforcement
and the creation of
the red route network – a lack of parking spaces in areas
of high demand
(particularly in residential areas around rail heads and
in shopping areas) and a
widespread flouting of parking regulations by drivers. The
lack of effective
enforcement also resulted in a culture amongst many drivers
that compliance
with parking regulations was not really expected and that
these regulations
were to be treated as approximations or as advisory or best
practice in a way
that would not be accepted for any other type of formal
regulation.
Objectives
31. The objective for the decriminalised enforcement regime
is to ensure
compliance with the regulations. As noted above, the Road
Traffic Regulation
Act 1984 sets out the only lawful objectives for making
parking regulations.
Both statute and case law (notably Cran v. LB Camden, 1997)
make it clear that
any authority that based its enforcement policy on the objective
of raising
revenue would be acting unlawfully. The Cran case did not
find that LB Camden
was acting unlawfully in its objectives and confirmed that
raising revenue was
not an objective for the borough. Despite the widespread
allegations that
councils are only interested in raising revenue, no evidence
has been presented
that councils are engaged in such widespread and systematic
unlawful activity.
Basic procedures
32. The 1991 Act provided for a widespread change in the
approach to parking
enforcement. On the street, local authority parking attendants
were
empowered to issue penalty charge notices (PCNs) and to
authorise vehicles to
be clamped or removed. The Government of the day required
this service to be
subject to compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) as a way
of introducing
private sector involvement.
33. From the outset, the overwhelming majority of PCN issue
has been
computerised, with attendants carrying hand held computers
or hand held
remote terminals. Parking attendants must also maintain
a log book, recording
all of their activity and supplementary information about
any vehicles issued
with a PCN or other incident. This includes, for example,
the vehicle’s tax disc
serial number and evidence that this has been recorded gives
considerable
weight to proving the attendant was present beside the vehicle
when issuing
the PCN. All conversations with the driver of a vehicle
are also recorded.
34. Parking attendants must (unless prevented) serve the
PCN by fixing it to the
vehicle or handing it to the driver or person in charge.
35. An important change introduced at the time was the withholding
of much of the traffic wardens’ discretion from parking
attendants. Nor are attendants
entitled to cancel a PCN after it has been issued. There
were a number of
reasons for this. First, it would reduce the impact of aggression
or corruption
on parking attendants, as they could not be forced to cancel
PCNs either by
aggressive drivers or by the offer of money or other inducements.
Second, it
improved consistency as local arrangements for a regular
traffic warden to turn
a ‘blind eye’ to certain forms of illegal parking would
no longer be possible
(avoiding trouble where a relief traffic warden was not
aware of the local
arrangement). Third, it ensured that any arguments about
exemptions or
mitigation would be dealt with at the town hall, rather
than on the street, where
council officers with specific training could consider the
case with more
information and more consistency than could a parking attendant.
A parking
attendant is not the right person to determine if arguments
of mitigation are
sufficient to warrant cancellation of a PCN.
36. It has been argued that attendants should have discretion
to, for example,
move on a driver rather than issue a PCN or to ignore very
short overstays on
parking meters. Where a driver is present in the car they
are likely to move on
smartly where an attendant appears as no PCN is valid if
it has not been given to
the driver or fixed to the vehicle (unless the attendant
is prevented from serving
the PCN). However, there is more of a problem if a driver
believes that he could
argue an attendant into letting him stop ‘for two minutes’.
This might cause
serious delays to other traffic, but an attendant could
grant this to avoid a
confrontation. ‘Moving on’ provides no deterrent for the
future and drivers may
be more prepared to risk stopping illegally without deterrent.
The argument for
just a short stop was frequently accepted by traffic wardens,
prior to
decriminalisation, and while this improved wardens’ relationships
with the
public, it is doubtful if it had any positive effect on
compliance with regulations.
37. A short overstay on a meter presents more of a difficulty
because it is entirely
coincidental when a parking attendant appears at any particular
site. A meter
might show only 2 minutes’ penalty but the attendant will
not know if the driver
intends to return very shortly or not.
38. Overall, it should be noted that a PCN is simply an
assertion of a prime-facie
case of illegal parking, unlike a fixed penalty notice (FPN)
which is issued only
where there is a much stronger case against the alleged
offender.
Penalty levels
39. Decriminalised parking penalties in London are set according
to the statutory
rules laid down by the Road Traffic Act 1991 (as amended
by the Greater London
Authority Act 1999). This requires the penalties to be determined
by a joint
committee of the London boroughs (ALG Transport and Environment
Committee) (on borough roads) or TfL (on the TLRN). In each
case, the
penalties must be confirmed by the Mayor of London and the
Secretary of State
has a residual right to veto penalty levels if he considers
them excessive.
Penalty levels are reviewed annually and in depth every
four years. Changes to
penalty levels are only agreed following widespread consultation
with road
users and other stakeholders.
40. The principle the ALG TEC has adopted in setting penalties
is that the lowest
penalty which provides sufficient deterrent with a coherent
pattern of penalties
should be used. The legislation also provides for a discounted
penalty where
early payment is made and ALG TEC has determined that this
discount should be
50%.
41. At present, three penalty bands apply in London reflecting
areas of different
parking pressures. Band A applies primarily in inner and
central London and
the main town centres; band B applies to the rest of outer
London; band C is
generally used in car parks in outer London.
42. Current penalty levels are:
|
Full
Penalty
|
Discounted
Penalty |
| Band
A |
£100
|
£50
|
| Band
B |
£80
|
£40
|
| Band
C |
£60
|
£30
|
43. ALG TEC also sets charges for declamping, pound release,
vehicle storage and
disposal. These are currently:
| Release
from clamp |
£65
|
| Release
from pound |
£150
|
| Vehicle
storage |
£25
per day |
| Vehicle
disposal |
£65 |
44. These charges are all set on the principle that they
should cover their costs without making a surplus. In practice,
on the basis of data from boroughs, most authorities make
a small loss on all of these activities which becomes larger
when non-payment from those vehicles not reclaimed form
the pound is taken into account.
PCN processing
45. PCNs are processed by local councils following the basic
arrangements set down
in the 1991 Act. In brief, these set out that:
• If the PCN is paid within 14 days a discount applies
• If the PCN is not paid within 28 days, the council may
issue a Notice to
Owner (NtO) to the keeper of the vehicle, who is then legally
liable for the
penalty. The NtO allows for formal representations to be
made to the
council against liability for the penalty
• If neither payment nor representations are received within
28 days, the
council may issue a charge certificate which has the effect
of increasing the
penalty by 50%
• If the charge certificate is not paid within 14 days,
the council may register
the penalty as a debt at the county court. This results
in a court order
requiring the person to pay the penalty at the charge certificate
level plus
£5 registration charge
• If this is not paid within 21 days, the council may apply
for a warrant of
execution, allowing bailiffs to seize goods to pay for the
debt. By this stage
the amount owing will include regulated bailiffs’ fees.
46. There are a number of stages at which the penalty can
be challenged. First,
immediately after issue of the PCN, the recipient can contest
this with the
council. This is an informal challenge as it is not part
of the statutory
procedure and, cannot, of itself, give access to the appeals
system. However,
councils are encouraged to consider challenges at this stage
and the ALG
recommends that if an informal challenge is made within
14 days of the issue of
the PCN and subsequently rejected by the council, the discount
should be reoffered for a further 14 days. Most, if not
all councils follow this advice.
Councils will accept challenges by a variety of media and
about 10% of all PCNs
are cancelled at this stage.
47. This level of cancellations should not be seen as evidence
of ‘fraudulent’ issue of PCNs, but reflects both production
of a case for an exemption (for example for
loading or unloading) and consideration of cases of mitigation.
48. Second, the keeper can make formal representations following
issue of the
Notice to Owner (or on recovery of the vehicle if it has
been clamped or
removed). These representations must be considered by the
council (and, if the
vehicle was clamped or removed, are deemed to have been
accepted by the
council if no response is made within 56 days). The 1991
Act sets out grounds
which, if accepted by the council, must result in cancellation
of the NtO and, in
some cases, cancellation of the PCN. Broadly, these grounds
fall into two groups
• That there was no contravention; or
• That there may have been a contravention but that the
person sent the NtO
was not liable to pay the penalty
At this, and indeed all stages, councils must consider the
use of their discretion
in mitigating circumstances.
49. If the representations are rejected, the keeper can
appeal to the independent
adjudicator, who can direct that the NtO (or PCN) is cancelled
if he or she
considers that one of the statutory grounds has been met.
The adjudicator
constitutes a statutory tribunal and an appeal to the adjudicator
replaces the
previous right to have the case heard in a magistrates’
court.
50. Councils are required to consider the use of their discretion
to cancel PCNs on
grounds of mitigation at all stages. While most do this,
it is clear that as this is
an implicit rather than explicit legal requirement, some
authorities are not as
clear on the matter as they should be. The Local Government
Ombudsman has
recently published a report on this10. The adjudicator cannot
allow an appeal
on the grounds of mitigation alone, nor would it help if
the adjudicator could do
so. If mitigation could be considered on appeal then there
would be every
incentive for motorists to appeal simply on the basis that
the adjudicator might
be more sympathetic, rather than on any statutory ground.
Adjudicators can
and do consider whether the councils have properly considered
the use of their
discretion and do refer cases back to councils where they
think this is
warranted. Adjudicators may cancel PCNs where the council
has not considered
using its discretion on the basis of abuse of process.
51. Finally, if the procedures fail at some stage, when
the keeper receives
notification of debt registration, a statutory declaration
can be made to the
effect that:
• No NtO was received
• A representation was made but no response received
• An appeal to the adjudicator was made but no response
received
If the first of these grounds is made, the NtO is cancelled.
In other cases the
matter is referred to the adjudicator.
52. All of the procedures operated by the councils and the
adjudicators are subject
to judicial review in the high court and administrative
matters can also be raised
through the Local Government Ombudsman.
The Parking Adjudicators
53. The parking adjudicators constitute a statutory tribunal
to consider appeals
against parking penalties and were created under the Road
Traffic Act 1991.
Under the Act, the adjudicators are appointed by ALG TEC,
subject to
confirmation by the Lord Chancellor. Adjudicators are appointed
following
public advertisement and a selection process agreed with
the Department of
Constitutional Affairs (DCA), including lay representatives
appointed by the
DCA. Adjudicators are appointed for 5 years and are re-appointed
at the end of
their appointment unless they fall within a limited number
of categories, such
as certified insanity or bankruptcy, or are declared unable
to carry out their role
properly by a judge appointed by the Lord Chancellor. While
adjudicators are
paid by the ALG TEC neither payment nor appointment rests
in any way on the
decisions they make.
54. Adjudicators must be barristers or solicitors of at
least five years’ standing. All
the adjudicators are part time and a panel of 54 adjudicators,
headed by a Chief
Adjudicator is currently in place. When considering appeals,
adjudicators sit
alone.
55. ALG TEC also provides the administrative support for
the adjudicators and
determines the sitting arrangements. This has been done
under the name of
the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service.
56. Arrangements for appeals have been set up with the users’
needs in mind:
• Appeals can either be made by post or in person – about
70% are currently
made by post
• Personal hearings are heard at the hearing centre in New
Zealand House in
central London
• Appellants wanting a personal hearing may choose a time
of their own
convenience. Hearings take place between 8am and 8pm, Monday
to Friday
and between 8am and 1pm on Saturdays.
• PATAS has a target of seeing personal appellants within
15 minutes of their
appointment. This is currently achieved in more than 80%
of cases.
• Personal hearings last on average about 20 minutes and
the appellant can
usually take away a written decision with them.
57. Users show a great deal of satisfaction with these arrangements.
User surveys
carried out by the ALG (most recently in 2003) show that,
while satisfaction
depends mainly on the result of the appeal12, over 80%of
appellants are
generally satisfied with the quality of the process. The
Leggat review of tribunals, conducted for the DCA in 2002,
described PATAS as ‘the most user
focussed aspect of justice’ in the UK.
Other ALG activities
58. ALG provides a number of parking enforcement related
services to and on behalf of the London boroughs. Most importantly,
it provides the TRACE service, a 24- hour call centre which
locates cars which have been removed from any London
street. Information is given to callers on the location
of their vehicle, why it
was removed and how it may be recovered. TRACE handles nearly
15,000 calls a
month.
59. ALG also provides link services between boroughs and
outside agencies such as
the DVLA and the county court, and services which link boroughs,
including a
persistent evader database, a ‘ringers’ database and a payment
information
exchange (which acts as a clearing house for penalty payments
made other than
directly to the authority concerned).
Training
60. Training for all involved with parking enforcement is
essential. At the outset of
decriminalisation in 1994, the then Parking Committee for
London 14set up a
certification scheme for attendants and supervisors. This
scheme, which
measured competencies, was based on three elements:
• Core training
• Local training
• Probationary period
61. The core training was a set standard covering all common
aspects of
enforcement. Local training took account of matters that
varied from one
authority to another. The probationary period was 6 months,
during which new
attendants had to demonstrate that they applied their training
correctly.
62. Training was given under employers’ own arrangements
by approved training
deliverers. External verifiers confirmed that the required
training was given
and that the attendants had the required competencies. Once
the probationary
period had been successfully completed, a certificate with
a 2-year life was
awarded, demonstrating that the attendant had successfully
completed all
aspects of training for that authority. Verifiers also confirmed
that sufficient
refresher training had been given for a renewal certificate.
63. Almost all attendants in London, at the time, possessed
PCfL certificates.
64. In the late 1990s, this certification scheme was translated
into a National
Vocational Qualification. This was to get further external
verification of the
quality of the scheme. However, the NVQ is less satisfactory
in a number of
ways:
• There is no time limit for a candidate
to achieve the qualification
• Once awarded there is no time limit on the qualification
• The qualification is not specific to any authority
• Unlike the PCfL certificate, the fee structure does not
provide any incentive
for employers to ensure that their employees achieve the
qualification
65. Accordingly, with the British Parking Association the
ALG are working to revert
to a certification scheme which acts, in effect as a licence
to practise. This will
also apply to back office staff.
Safety and security of PAs
66. Parking attendants work in difficult circumstances,
frequently on their own.
While the outcome of their work is beneficial to London,
those receiving parking
penalties are rarely appreciative of this and many are abusive.
Some resort to
violence. Across London the level of assaults is rising.
On average, more than
three parking attendants are assaulted every day in London
– a shocking
statistic15.
67. Within this total, attendants have been run over, have
been assaulted by gangs
with baseball bats and have been shot at – all because they
issued a parking
ticket.
68. There is no specific offence of assaulting a parking
attendant on duty, although
there are such offences for police officers and traffic
wardens. The boroughs
have sought to create such an offence through private legislation,
most recently
in 2000, but this has not been accepted by Parliament.
69. Response and support from the police has been patchy.
Some police stations
are pro-active and police officers and parking attendants
can work closely
together. In Kensington & Chelsea, the MPS and the local
authority developed
a ‘side by side’ initiative for mutual assistance and support
and this has reduced
attacks on attendants substantially. This has been extended
to other boroughs.
Others do little more than treat assaults on parking attendants
as common
assault and are reluctant to get involved.
70. Boroughs and employers seek to prosecute assaults on
parking attendants
wherever possible and to publicise convictions.
Use of contracts
71. Much activity connected with enforcement is contracted
out and a great deal
has been made of it. Under the legislation in place in 1991,
parking attendant
services, clamping and removal services were subject to
compulsory competitive
tendering (CCT) and, as a result, about half the London
boroughs use contracted
out attendants and almost all clamping and removal activity
is contracted out.
72. Details of contracts vary and are commercially confidential.
However, most
contracts provide some incentive for contractors to perform,
none provide for
straightforward commission payments and none provide limitless
incentives for
contractors to issue more and more penalties. No incentives
or defaults are
based solely on PCN issue. Where any ticket targets are
included these are
usually accompanied by maximum ticket issue numbers and/or
tapering
payments to contractors as PCN numbers climb. Where PCNs
are issued and are
subsequently cancelled, contractors will generally lose
money as PCNs which are
cancelled as a result of attendant error will not count
towards any ticket targets.
This gives contractors an incentive not to issue PCNs which
may be doubtful.
73. More contracts are based on patrol frequency rather
than any PCN issue target. The British Parking Association
is currently trialling a model form of contract
with LB Hackney. This is based more on disincentives to
poor quality
behaviour.
74. Individual attendants may be incentivised. Here, again,
no parking attendant
receives a commission on each ticket issued. No incentive
scheme rests wholly
or even mainly on PCNs issued. Other factors, such as attendance,
appearance
and quality are also important. No parking attendant benefits
in any way from
issuing a PCN which is subsequently cancelled because of
their failure.
75. Initially, almost half the boroughs contracted out processing
of PCNs and
correspondence, but this activity has now been brought back
into house by
almost all authorities. Certain aspects, such as consideration
of
representations and registration of debt must be done by
the authorities inhouse.
Common standards
76. Common standards are important in a number of areas
of activity. The ALG
TEC’s predecessor (PCfL) produced a Code of Practice on
parking enforcement in
1993. This was updated in 1997 and is being updated again
at present. The
Code of Practice covers areas such as policies, procedures,
priorities and notices
and provides guidance over a range of issues
77. In addition to the Code of Practice, the ALG TEC produced
a parking attendant’s handbook which details all the contraventions
and the various exemptions to them. This also provides standards
for ‘de minimis’ rules on contraventions. For example, it
suggests that for vehicles parked outside the markings of
the bay (offence code 24) there should be at least one wheel
wholly outside the markings of the bay before a PCN is issued.
Similarly, for vehicles parked on the footway, the ‘de minimis’
rule advised is that there should be at least one wheel
wholly on the footway before a PCN is issued.
78. ALG holds regular seminars for parking managers and
appeal staff and the
Transport and Environment Committee periodically issues
advice to boroughs.
ALG does not, though, have the powers to enforce such advice
and it is not
automatically accepted outside London, where authorities
develop their own
standards individually.
Outcomes (boroughs)
79. Over the period from 1970 to 1994 there was, in effect,
a moratorium on the
creation of new controlled parking zones because of the
lack of police resources
to enforce them16. This was in spite of increasing demands
from the public as
the pressure on parking spaces, driven by increased car
use, grew. Following
decriminalisation in 1994, there has been a big increase
in the number of CPZs,
in part, catching up with the backlog created during the
‘70s and ‘80s.
80. As mentioned above, CPZs are not created for policy
purposes such as reducing car use, but in response to public
pressure. Growth in the volume of controls has followed
with both more zones and extended hours. Whereas, before
1994, controlled hours finished at 6.30pm (reflecting the
fact that traffic wardens
would then be off shift), hours now extend until later in
the evening and include
both Saturday afternoons and Sundays.
81. More than 100 new CPZs or extensions have been created
since 1994.
PCNs Issued
82. PCN numbers, together with clamps and removals have
increased since 1994 as
shown on the diagrams below.
83. In 1991/92, the last full year of police responsibility
for parking enforcement,
1.8m Fixed Penalty Notices were issued. By 2003-04, boroughs
and TfL were
issuing nearly 6m PCNs. The growth in numbers has resulted
from:
• New and extended CPZs
• New decriminalised offences, such as bus lanes and moving
traffic offences
• The introduction of camera enforcement
• Tougher enforcement of existing regulations
84. Estimates17 in the early 1990s were that less than 1%
of illegally parked cars
received any form of penalty. That has now grown to an estimated
10% of
illegally parked cars receiving any form of penalty. Where
CCTV is in use for
enforcement, the percentage of contraventions being penalised
is much higher,
to about 80% (and in some cases higher). In these cases,
there is evidence that
sustained enforcement is reducing the number of contraventions.
85. Pilot schemes for bus lane enforcement using CCTV showed
a dramatic effect (as
shown in the diagram below) and those boroughs enforcing
bus lanes for more
than a year are now seeing a decline in the number of bus
lane PCNs being
issued.
Outcomes (appeals)
86. On average councils receive some form of challenge on
nearly 20% of PCNs.
These challenges range from queries over offences and misunderstandings
on
regulations to exemptions applied for and challenges to
the proper issue of the
PCN. Many of these are resolved simply on the basis of a
telephone call or
letter. Fewer PCNs are subject to formal representations.
A smaller number
still are subject to the appeals process. A little under
1% of PCNs issued result
in an appeal to the adjudicator. This percentage has remained
broadly constant
since 1997-98, although the total number of appeals has
grown as the number
of PCNs issued has grown. About 20% of appeals registered
cover issues of
liability (such as the identity of the vehicle keeper) while
the remainder
challenge the alleged contravention.
87. Appeal rates vary from borough to borough. As much as
anything else, this is a
result of the borough’s approach to representations. There
are three extreme
positions which could be taken by a borough:
• To allow most representations with limited customer involvement
• To reject most representations with limited customer involvement
• To engage in high levels of customer involvement on every
case.
88. The first option is cheap to operate, has high levels
of customer support and
results in few appeals to the adjudicator – on the other
hand it results in low
compliance as motorists know that it is fairly easy to get
a PCN cancelled. The
second option is also cheap to operate but results in a
larger number of appeals
and lower customer satisfaction – but it will result in
better compliance with
regulations. The third option may deal with customers well
and will result in
few appeals but is very expensive and may result in extensive
delays before a
case is settled.
89. In practice no borough adopts any of these extreme positions.
However, there
are many quite legitimate policy positions within this range
which will result in
different appeal rates. It is, therefore, impossible to
draw any conclusions
about a borough’s performance from appeal data alone.
90. On average, about 60% of appeals are allowed by the
adjudicators, a figure
which has remained broadly constant over the years, while
the percentage of
appeals heard at a personal hearing is also broadly constant
and the percentage
of appeals not contested by the authorities, at about 30%,
is slowly climbing.
Authorities do not contest appeals generally for one of
three reasons:
• The appellant provides further information at appeal which,
if provided
earlier, would have resulted in the appeal being allowed
• A review of the case by a more senior official before
the appeal evidence is
submitted results in a change of view by the council
• The council does not have sufficient administrative resource
to provide
sufficient evidence for the appeal
91. Adjudicators may award costs in limited circumstances,
where an appellant has
been frivolous or vexatious, or where the council has acted
wholly
unreasonably. In 2003/04, appellants applied for costs in
102 cases and costs
were awarded in 37 of these. £2,677 was awarded in costs
against councils.
Councils themselves applied for costs in 14 cases. In 13
cases costs totalling
£605 were awarded against appellants. All of these occurred
in cases where a
statutory declaration had been made improperly or incorrectly
(for example
where an appellant alleges he had appealed to the adjudicator
and had no
response when an appeal had been made and decided and the
appellant had
entered into correspondence on the decision).
92. Put together, the appeals outcomes when combined with
the attempts made by
the PATAS to be as accessible as possible suggest that the
system is, overall,
very robust. Had the enforcement system in London been seriously
wrong there
would have been a growing number of appeals and a growing
percentage of
those appeals allowed.
Other outcomes
93. About 20% of PCNs are neither paid nor cancelled but
cannot be followed up.
This is mainly because either the keeper cannot be identified
or the identified
keeper cannot be traced or enforcement action is not possible.
Although the
DVLA claim that their database is about 96% accurate, the
level of identification
for PCNs is far lower with no keeper identification for
about15% of PCNs. This is
either because:
• There is no keeper recorded
• The vehicle is a ringer
• The vehicle is registered outside the UK18
94. In addition, it must be remembered that those people
who know they are not on
the DVLA database are more likely to ignore parking regulations
deliberately.
95. In a smaller number of cases enforcement action cannot
be taken either because
the keeper has moved and is no longer traceable or because
the keeper lives
outside the UK where enforcement action can only be undertaken
at
disproportionate cost.
Finance
96. PCN penalty income is retained by boroughs. This income,
together with
income from on-street parking charges, must go into a separate
parking
account, regulated in terms of the Road Traffic Regulation
Act 1984. This Act
provides that any surplus of income over expenditure can
only be used in limited
circumstances:
• For the provision of further parking facilities, on or
off-street, within or
without the borough boundaries; and, where further expenditure
on parking
facilities is either unnecessary or undesirable
• On public transport facilities, services or improvements
• On highway improvements
• On road maintenance
• On schemes to support the transport strategy of the Mayor
of London
• On environmental improvements
97. In this way, much of the cost of Freedom Pass, which
provides free public
transport for London’s elderly and disabled residents, is
funded from parking
account surpluses. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Freedom
Pass scheme could be
sustained in its present form without funding from this
source. Hungerford
Bridge footbridge and parts of the London Cycle Network
are also examples of
the use to which parking account surpluses have been put.
98. The Traffic Management Act 2004 provides that for authorities
defined as
‘excellent’ under CPA appraisal all limitations are lifted,
but this has yet to be
brought into effect.
99. Each authority must submit an annual report on their
parking account to the
Mayor of London, including an account of what use has been
made of any
surpluses.
100. Most, but not all, boroughs make some surplus on their
parking accounts.
However, the main reason for any surplus rests with parking
charges rather than
parking penalties. As described above, authorities are advised
that parking
charges should be set on a market basis, so that about 85%
occupancy is
achieved. In many authorities, charges are lower than this.
Parking
enforcement on its own is normally little more than self-financing.
101. For 2002/03, the London authorities made a total income
in parking accounts
of about £300m. Against this, operational costs accounted
for about £185m,
leaving a surplus of about £115m. Income and expenditure
figures for
boroughs for 2002-03 are shown in an appendix
Publicity
102. All parking regulations, parking penalty levels and
their application are
subject to consultation with residents, users and other
stakeholders before a
final decision is made. The case of Cran v LB Camden (1997)
made clear the
approach that boroughs must have towards consultation, particularly
that it
must be thorough and open minded.
103. All parking regulations must also be properly signed.
The Department for
Transport lays out in regulations (The Traffic Signs Regulations
and General
Directions 2002) the design and layout of signs. Any regulations
which are not
signed in accordance with these regulations are unenforceable.
104. Opinion surveys are regularly carried out on enforcement.
In autumn 2003,
the ALG’s Survey of Londoners revealed that 50% of Londoners
considered
parking enforcement to be too lax, while 19% considered
it to be too strict.
31% thought it was about right. In 2004, views had shifted
with 29% now
considering parking enforcement to be too lenient (40% for
bus lanes), 38%
considering it to be about right (35% for bus lanes) and
25% considering it to
be too strict (18% for bus lanes).
105. While there has been a lot of negative publicity, particularly
early in 2004, it is
hard to conclude that this indicates majority discontent
with the parking
enforcement regime. While it is accepted that there are
instances of poor or
unacceptable behaviour, these do appear to be in a small
minority of occasions.
Within such a large scale exercise, however, even a small
percentage represents
a large number, giving ample scope for reportage. In some
cases reports have
been fictitious for example, films purporting to show attendants
attacking
motorists. In other cases only a partial story – solely
the motorist’s view is told.
Authorities are always cautious about letting individual
incidents develop into a
‘trial by media’, especially where (as in most cases) the
issue has not come
before an adjudicator.
106. This should not be taken to mean that authorities do
not take reported case
seriously.
107. Having said that the media coverage may not give a
true representation of
parking enforcement, it does provide an incentive for further
assaults on
parking attendants. Lurid stories of poor or mercenary behaviour
by attendants
are used by some to justify aggressive behaviour in return.
Given the high level
of assaults, such reportage helps make a bad situation worse.
Accountability
108. Unlike most law enforcement, elected councillors are
directly responsible for
the policies towards enforcement in their authority (local
councillors do not get
involved with decisions on individual parking penalties).
In its own right this
provides better safeguards against excesses than might occur
elsewhere. It
also ensures that there is a proper feedback from voters
to the council on
policies.
109. In many cases, parking enforcement activities have
been subject to detailed
local scrutiny. For example, a major scrutiny in LB Lambeth
was completed in
2004 while LB Camden is undertaking its own scrutiny at
present.
110. This level of scrutiny and accountability is unmatched
elsewhere in the
enforcement systems in the UK where operational independence
of police
commissioners and chief constables and judicial independence
of the courts
prevent detailed examination.
Conclusions
111. Overall, London’s parking enforcement regime provides
an approach which
reduces congestion and accidents and which regulates use
of the kerb space
more effectively than its predecessor and does so at no
net cost to the public.
Any approach to increasing enforcement is bound to bring
complaints from
those who previously were able to get away with unlawful
behaviour for their
own benefit.
112. Within that the statutory approach to challenges to
penalties, ending up with
the independent adjudicator, provides a demonstrably robust
system.
113. This is not to say that there are neither errors made
nor improvements that can
be made. London’s local authorities actively review their
own arrangements to
look for these and will continue to do this.
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